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Since its first formulation in a famous 1894 article by Pierre Curie, the
principle stating that “the symmetries of the causes are to be found in the
effects” has been defended or questioned on diffferent grounds. In recent
decades, it has become the object of renewed philosophical discussion in
connection with the growing interest in the role of symmetry and symmetry
breaking in physics (Ismael, 1997; Belot, 2003; Earman, 2004; Roberts 2013).
In this literature, it has become current to understand (and question) the
principle as following from the invariance properties of deterministic phys-
ical laws. The seminal paper for this “received view” is Chalmers (1970),
introducing a formulation of Curie’s principle in terms of the relationship
between the symmetries of earlier and later states of a system and the dy-
namical law connecting these states. This re-formulation places the emphasis
in a different place with respect to Curie. Curie’s focus was clearly on the
case of co-existing, functionally related features of a system’s state, rather
than temporally ordered cause and effect pairs. While Chalmers (1970) and
Ismael (1997) still emphasize the generality of the principle by including in
their formulations physical situations of the type considered by Curie, this is
no more the case in what has become the received view.
Is there more that one “Curie’s principle”, then? How far are differ-
ent formulations legitimate? Given the important and widely acknowledged
methodological role of the principle in science, are there features to be high-
lighted and used for a modern formulation? What are the aspects that make
it so scientifically fruitful, independently of how it is formulated?
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The paper is devoted to exploring these questions. We start with illus-
trating Curie’s original article and his focus. Then, we consider the way that
the discussion of the principle took shape from early commentators to its
modern form. We say why we think that the modern focus on the inter-state
version of the principle loses sight of some of the most interesting significant
applications of the principle. Finally, we address criticism of the principle
put forward by Norton (2014) and purported counterexamples due to Roberts
(2013, 2014).
1 Curie’s “conside´rations”: the origin of the
principle
Curie devoted a series of works to examining the role of symmetry and asym-
metry in physical phenomena. His analysis was centered on the question:
which phenomena are allowed to occur in a given physical medium having
specified symmetry properties? His studies of such properties as the pyro-
and piezo-electricity of crystals persuaded him of the importance of the re-
lationships between the symmetry of a physical medium and the symmetry
of the phenomena occurring in it.
By applying methods and results of the crystallographic theory of sym-
metry groups to the study of a number of physical phenomena in his seminal
1894 paper, he arrived at the following conclusions:
(a1) When certain causes produce certain effects, the symmetry elements of the causes
must be found in their effects.
(a2) When certain effects show a certain dissymmetry, this dissymmetry must be found
in the causes which gave rise to them.1
(a3) In practice, the converses of these two propositions are not true, i.e., the effects can
be more symmetric than their causes.
(b) A phenomenon may exist in a medium having the same characteristic symmetry
or the symmetry of a subgroup of its characteristic symmetry.2 In other words,
certain elements of symmetry can coexist with certain phenomena, but they are
1Curie uses the term “dissymetry” in his paper, where we would today use the term
“asymmetry”.
2Curie defines “the characteristic symmetry of a phenomenon” as “the maximum sym-
metry compatible with the existence of the phenomenon”. For example, the characteristic
symmetry of a force, a velocity, or the intensity of an electric field is that of an arrow
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not necessary. What is necessary, is that certain elements of symmetry do not
exist. Dissymmetry is what creates the phenomenon.
Conclusion (a1) is what has become known as Curie’s principle (CP). Con-
clusion (a2) is logically equivalent to (a1); the claim is that symmetries of
the cause are necessarily found in the effect, while dissymmetries of the cause
need not be. Conclusion (a3) clarifies this claim, emphasizing that since dis-
symmetries of the cause need not be found in the effect, the effect may be
more symmetric than the cause.
Conclusion (b) invokes a distinction, found in all of Curie’s examples, be-
tween medium and phenomena. CP states that the symmetry of the medium
cannot be higher than the symmetry of the phenomenon.3 If the medium
in which a phenomenon occurs starts out in a highly symmetric state, CP
entails that the original symmetry group of the medium must be lowered to
the symmetry group of the phenomenon (or to a subgroup thereof). In this
sense symmetry breaking is what “creates the phenomenon”.
1.1 Applications
In order to illustrate how his principle applies, Curie discusses a number
of cases where symmetry considerations impose necessary conditions for the
occurrence of some phenomenon. He typically considers situations where
“several phenomena of different nature superpose in a single system” and
asserts that in those cases, the symmetry group of the system includes only
those symmetries common to all of the superposed phenomena (p. 127).
His first illustration is the phenomenon known as the Wiedemann effect.
This phenomenon, discovered by Gustav Wiedemann in 1858, can be repre-
sented in three different ways, depending on the order in which an electric
field, a magnetic field and a torque are combined in an iron cylindrical wire:
(a) The generation of an asymmetrical torque in an iron cylindrical wire
when a longitudinal electric field and a longitudinal magnetization are
applied.
(truncated cone), while the characteristic symmetry of the intensity of a magnetic field is
that of a cylinder rotating about its axis.
3Thus, for a magnetic field (the effect) to exist, the medium (the cause) must have a
symmetry lower or equal to that of a rotating cylinder.
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(b) The generation of a longitudinal electric field when a longitudinal mag-
netization of an iron cylindrical wire and an asymmetrical torque are
applied.
(c) The longitudinal magnetization of an iron cylindrical wire when a lon-
gitudinal electric field and an asymmetrical torque are applied.
What is being considered cause and effect for the purposes of applying CP
depends on the description chosen.
Let us choose one description, say (c). In this case, the longitudinal mag-
netization is the effect, and all the rest – the cylindrical wire, the longitudinal
electric field, the asymmetrical torque – the cause. The original symmetry
group of the wire, before the application of the electric field and the torque,
is the symmetry group of a cylinder at rest. For the magnetization of the
wire to occur, the symmetry group must be lowered to that of a rotating
cylinder. This is what happens under the combined action of the electric
field and the torque (dissymmetrization of the cause).
1.2 Curie’s focus
In the last section of his paper, reflecting on the heuristic power of his sym-
metry considerations, Curie emphasizes two kinds of conclusions.
The first are “firm but negative” conclusions:
There is no effect without causes. Effects are the phenomena which always
necessarily require a certain dissymmetry in order to arise. If this dissym-
metry does not exist, the phenomena are impossible.
The utility of CP, in this case, is to save us the trouble of searching for
phenomena that can’t occur.
The second are “positive but lacking the same degree of certainty and
precision”:
There is no cause without effects. Effects are the phenomena which can
arise in a medium possessing a certain dissymmetry. One has here precious
directions for the discovery of new phenomena [...] We have no idea of the
order of magnitude of the predicted phenomena; we have only an imperfect
idea of their precise nature.
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The utility of CP, here, is the guidance it provides about where to search for
new phenomena, although we are not assured of finding anything.
The original CP has thus an important methodological function. On the
one hand, it furnishes a selection rule (given an initial situation with a spec-
ified symmetry, only certain phenomena are allowed to occur); on the other
hand, it offers a falsification criterion for physical theories (a violation of CP
may indicate that something is wrong in the physical description). Of course,
in order for the principle to be applicable, various conditions need to be sat-
isfied: the cause and effect must be well-defined, they must be related by a
deterministic equation, and the symmetries of both the cause and the effect
must be well-defined. This last condition applies to both the physical and
the geometrical properties of the system under consideration. Modulo these
conditions, CP provides necessary conditions for given phenomena to occur:
only those phenomena can occur that are compatible with the symmetry
conditions stated by the principle.
Curie was relatively unconcerned with providing a justification for his
conclusions. At the beginning of the paper, he states that the nature of
symmetry considerations is analogous to that of dimensional considerations.
By this he meant that CP is to be intended as a heuristic tool, demanding
no more justification than its successful application in guiding our search for
new phenomena and theory construction.
2 Re-formulations of CP
Since Curie’s paper, the significance of CP has been questioned at various
times. In the last three decades especially, the focus has shifted from the
heuristic reading of the principle to questions about the status and validity
of CP. A point of special concern, for example, has been the relation of the
principle to the phenomenon of “spontaneous symmetry breaking”.4
The central question has become whether the validity of CP can be
demonstrated. The common strategy has been a) to start with making
Curie’s original statement more precise, by offering a definition of cause and
effect, and, then, b) to appeal to other principles (determinism, invariance)
from which CP could follow analytically. The seminal work, in this direction,
is Chalmers (1970): the paper is entirely devoted to examining the status
and uses of CP, offering a proof for it where the principle is derived from the
4This issue has been dealt with in Ismael, 1997, and Castellani, 2003.
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invariance properties of deterministic physical laws. This view has become
the dominant one in the philosophical discussion on CP (see Earman, 2004;
Roberts, 2013).
2.1 From Chalmers (1970) on
In his 1970 paper Chalmers’ strategy was, first, “to present as precise and
as general a formulation of Curie’s principle as possible” (reformulation of
CP); then, on the basis of this reformulation, to show that “CP follows,
for deterministic laws, from their invariance properties” (proof of CP by
reduction to other principles).
Chalmers’ main novelty is the extension of the principle from the syn-
chronic cases considered by Curie, where the cause and effect are simulta-
neous, to diachronic cases, where the cause precedes the effect and they are
related by a deterministic dynamical law. Thus, for example, “the positions
and velocities of a system of Newtonian particles can be considered the cause
of their positions and velocities at some later time” (p. 137).
With this extension, Chalmers proceeds to prove the validity of CP.
Schematically, his argument goes as follows.
Claim: CP follows from the invariance properties of physical laws if these
are deterministic.
Premises (P1-P4)
P1: Definition of cause (effect): C(t1) is the cause of the effect E(t2) (t2 ≥
t1), if C(t1) is sufficient to ensure E(t2).
P2: Determinism: E = f(C), where f is a function equivalent to a set of
ordered pairs (C,E), known if the laws of nature are known.
P3: T-symmetry of the laws: invariance of the laws under the transfor-
mation T , that is T [f(C)] = f [T (C)] (the symmetry transformation
commutes with the function f , that is the pair (C,E) is transformed
into the pair (TC, TE)).
P4: T-symmetry of the cause: invariance of C under the transformation T ,
that is T (C) = C.
Conclusion (C)
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C: T-symmetry of the effect: invariance of E under the transformation T ,
that is T (E) = E.
Chalmers’ proof that C (the symmetry of the cause is to be found in the
effect) obtains from P1, P2, P3 and P4 as follows:
From P2: E = f(C)
Apply T : T (E) = T [f(C)]
For P3: T (E) = f [T (C)]
For P4: T (E) = f(C)
For P2 again: T (E) = E












Chalmers’ proof is taken for granted in recent literature, albeit reformu-
lated in slightly different terms and from a completely diachronic point of
view (Belot, 2003; Earman, 2004; Roberts, 2013). Accordingly, the main is-
sue has become whether symmetry properties of states are preserved through
dynamical evolution (which was not at all Curie’s original concern). In terms
of this “received view”, the natural reading of CP is that a system cannot
evolve from a symmetric to an asymmetric state. In deterministic cases, this
version of CP (let’s call it CPRV ) follows straightforwardly from the symme-
try of the dynamical law.5
5Proof proceeds in the same way as Chalmers’ one, just reformulated in terms of the
symmetry properties of earlier and later states of a system.
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CPRV differs from the original principle in its exclusive focus on dynamics.
We have been concerned here to exhibit the synchronic applications of the
principle that Curie himself emphasized and restore the general reading of
the principle given, for example in Ismael (1997). In what follows, we respond
to some recent discussions that we believe treat Curie unfairly.
3 Defending Curie
3.1 On Norton’s criticism
Norton (2014) portrays Curies Principle as a contribution to a long history
of causal metaphysics. He argues that CP fails to provide a “general, factual
causal principle to which all science must conform” or a “factual principle of
causality that usefully restricts our science”. All of this seems to us orthog-
onal to Curie’s intent. The causal vocabulary was perhaps unfortunate, but
Curie doesn’t seem to have meant anything more by ‘causal relation’ than
a functional relationship. He writes: “Whenever a physical phenomenon is
expressed as an equation, there is a causal relation between the quantities
appearing in both terms”.
Early commentators on the paper explicitly adopted the deflationary
reading of the causal language. For example, Ismael (1997, p. 169) writes:
“What the principle says depends crucially on how the terms ‘cause’ and ‘ef-
fect’ are understood, ... Let A and B be families {A1, A2, ...} and {B1, B2, ...}
respectively, of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive event types, and let
the statement that A is a Curie-cause and B its Curie-effect mean that the
physical laws provide a many-one mapping of A into B”. So construed, the
principle is quite general. There is no restriction on the terms on what the
terms of the relation can be. As we have seen, they can be different aspects
of the total state of one system at a single time, or total states of a system
at two different times. Someone who wants to apply the principle simply has
to find a functional relationship.
Norton seems doubtful that the principle in this form – i.e., as he says,
“a simple tautology” – can play any useful role in science. The only response
to this sort of doubt is provide examples. In the highly mathematical setting
of modern physics, CP is remarkable for being a purely qualitative principle
that gives one a very abstract sense of how the states that fall in one class
relate to states that fall in another class, when there is a deterministic rela-
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tion between them. The most straightforward cases are those in which we
have a pair of states of a physical system related by a dynamical law. Molec-
ular biology is replete with particularly impressive instances of apparently
T -symmetric conditions giving rise, by evidently deterministic processes, to
apparently T -asymmetric effects. Frog zygotes, for example, start out as
spherical cells suspended in a homogenous seeming fluid and develop into
highly structured organisms; almost every stage in their development intro-
duces asymmetries not apparently present in the preceding stage. So long as
the evolution is deterministic we can conclude that either (i) the symmetric
facade of the initial state concealed all of the asymmetries revealed in the
final state, (ii) dynamically relevant T -asymmetric factors were introduced
by the environment, or (iii) T is not a symmetry of the law of evolution. CP
just focuses ones physical understanding by setting the task of finding out
which it is.
The frog zygote example is very easy to visualize because cause and effect
are physical states and the law equation is a dynamical equation, but CP also
applies to cases that aren’t so easy to visualize. Here is one, for example, that
might not seem obvious. Consider all of the confusion about the separation of
ontic and epistemic states in quantum mechanics. The psi-empiricists think
that a lot of what look like ontic effects in quantum mechanics are disguised
epistemic affects. They derive various kinds of oddities in the evolution
of the quantum state (from collapse to teleportation to remote steering) by
interpreting the quantum state as a representation of partial knowledge about
an underlying ontic state. CP can act in that setting as a desideratum on how
much you have to put into the ontic state. It can tell us, without knowing
anything more specific, that if we have an ontic asymmetry in the final state
after any quantum process, there has to be an ontic asymmetry in the initial
state or the law of evolution.
CP also suggests a purely qualitative way of understanding the physical
significance of automorphisms of the solution set. Instead of thinking of
them as automorphisms of the set of solutions, we can think of them as
transformations among the values of dynamically relevant parameters that
preserve the relations described by the laws. The symmetries of a set of
equations determining one among a family B of alternatives, then, correspond
physically to either
1. Permutations of the values of B-irrelevant parameters, or
2. Irrelevant permutations of B-relevant parameters, i.e. transformations
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which either map them onto themselves or are accompanied by com-
pensating transformations in the values of other parameters in such a
way as to preserve the relation described by the law.
The contrapositive of this is that transformations which aren’t symme-
tries correspond physically to relevant permutations of the values of relevant
parameters. That is a very simple idea that captures the physical content of
the symmetries of a set of laws, and provides a kind of physical insight into
what the symmetries of a set of laws are, in a way that you can explain to
someone who has never taken a math class in his life.
It can also be useful for the physicist and philosopher of physics, because it
can be so easy for physical insight to get compromised by mathematics. The
interpretation of transformations that aren’t symmetries of the laws is easy to
see in the case of non-geometric transformations, when the transformations
permute the values of parameters in the equation expressing the laws. In the
case of geometric symmetries, it can play a particularly useful role. If dynam-
ical theories are formulated in their traditional coordinate-dependent manner
and geometric transformations are represented as transformations between
coordinate-systems, T may be an asymmetry of the laws determining B, even
though no T -asymmetric parameter appears in the B-determining equations.
This, combined with the historical confusion about the precise nature of the
coordinate-dependence, obscured the physical significance of geometric trans-
formations for generations. Its only when we insist on a generally covariant
formulation that we have to put something in the equations that itself is not
invariant under T . Consider a universe which exists for exactly a minute
and consists of a sphere which gradually deforms into an ellipse. You cant
write down a deterministic equation describing the evolution of the sphere
in a generally covariant form without including a parameter whose value is
not invariant under spatial rotations, because you will need to distinguish
the direction along which the sphere elongates.
3.2 On Roberts’ criticism
Roberts (2013) describes a simple classical situation that presents a straight-
forward apparent failure of CP. He generalizes it to a wide class that includes
both classical and quantum cases. Roberts (2014) describes related apparent
failures of the principle. Since we saw that the principle that we are calling
Curie’s Principle is a tautology, we know that the examples can’t be failures of
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that. The mathematical analysis of the examples shows what is really going
on. All of the examples concern time reversal. The physical interpretation
of the formal operation known as time reversal symmetry has always been
obscure and it becomes clear that time reversal as it is standardly understood
both classically and in quantum mechanics is not a symmetry transforma-
tion in a sense that is needed for the truth of CP. That conclusion reveals
something of importance about this complex and contested transformation.
The fact that the transformation as standardly defined doesn’t satisfy CP
gives us good reasons for being suspicious of reasoning with it as we do with
other symmetry transformations.
A set of dynamical laws is invariant under time reversal, just in case, if
A is a solution to the laws, where A is an initial state and B is a final state,
then B → A is as well. Given a set of laws that have this property, CP
says that if the initial state has some symmetry, the final state has it as well.
CP will hold, however, only if the states on which time-reversal operates
do not themselves contain dynamical information. This is just what one
would expect, for if the states contain dynamical information i.e., if the
states contain information not just about where the system is at a given
moment (in physical space, or state-space) but where it will be the next -
time reversing the sequence doesnt even make sense. If we include velocities
in state descriptions, and time reverse a sequence of states by simply reversing
the order of the states in the sequence, we get nonsense. The standard fix
is to also reverse the velocities, and any other quantities that go into the
specification of state that also contain dynamical information. This raises
the question of which quantities contain dynamical information.
In physical terms, time reversal should leave the states intrinsically un-
touched and just change their order. If we cleave to that understanding
of time reversal, none of the counterexamples Roberts offers constitutes a
failure of CP. The central example in Roberts (2013) is that of a classical
harmonic oscillator initially compressed out of equilibrium with zero momen-
tum. The final state has positive momentum in the direction away from the
way to which it is affixed. Roberts’ claim is that the initial state is invariant
under time reversal, and the final state is not. Since the laws are invariant
under time reversal, this is a failure of CP. We claim, contra Roberts, that
the final state is invariant under time reversal if we consider the intrinsic,
instantaneous state of the spring.
In his contribution to this symposium, Roberts considers a collection of
examples drawn from electromagnetism. In those cases, the problem is rather
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different. There we say that the theory is not time reversal invariant in the
sense relevant to the application of CP. Roberts briefly considers ways of
restricting what counts as a “symmetry transformation” that would preserve
the truth of CP and rejects it on the grounds that time reversal will no longer
count as a symmetry of the laws, remarking that “The price of this response
is that one must give up the standard meaning of ‘time reversal invariance’,
in favor of a property that is almost never satisfied” (p. 12). It is not obvious
that this isnt the right response. Indeed, it was on grounds very like this that
Albert (2000) argued that no theory since Newtonian Mechanics has been
genuinely time reversal invariant. The discussion of time reversal invariance
is ongoing and heavily contested. There is no broad agreement on the proper
definition. The operation is quite singular in various ways.
Is this a fair response to the examples? In what sense is CP a neces-
sary truth if we get to dis-count counterexamples on the ground that they
don’t use “symmetry transformation” in the way demanded for the truth
of CP? We believe that it is a legitimate response. The principle is not a
logical truth. Its truth is not independent of the meanings of its terms. The
physical intuition at the heart of CP depends on symmetry transformations
being understood as operating on the intrinsic states of systems related by a
deterministic equation. The fact that it fails for time reversal as standardly
understood shows that the formal operation known as time-reversal in the
physical literature has drifted rather far from that meaning. There is no
point in fighting about whether to hang onto a formulation of CP that uses
“the symmetries of the laws” in standard way, or to preserve the principle
at the cost of restricting what counts as a symmetry of the laws. We can all
agree that in trying to suss out the physical content of symmetry operations
that we can define mathematically, it can be very helpful to force oneself
back to the physical insight at the heart of CP and to understand what is
happening in these apparent failures.
3.3 Summing up
The general physical insight at the heart of CP is: if A and B are the domain
and range of a deterministic law, D, wherever D is not symmetric under a
transformation T , T must permute some physically significant feature of the
situation implicated in the production of B. Another way to put it is that T
must take us across boundaries of physical equivalence classes.
Figuring out how to apply that basic insight in the mathematically com-
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plex setting of contemporary physics can help to clarify the physical content
of mathematical operations like time reversal. Norton (2014) points out that
there is a lot of leeway in how we apply CP to a situation, and we can for-
mally put the asymmetry into the domain or into the law. Of course hes right
about that. But then he goes on to say: “There is no higher principle that
dictates which mapping [of causal vocabulary onto the physics] is correct.
What decides the mapping used is familiarity, comfort and, ultimately, our
whim” (p. 6).
This last remark is just wrong, both as a descriptive claim and as a nor-
mative one. Perhaps sometimes what decides the mapping is familiarity,
comfort, or whim. But it doesnt have to be. It is common in physics to
have a lot of leeway in how we represent a single physical situation. Different
ways of modeling a situation will give us different kinds of insight, displaying
different patterns or relationships in a perspicuous way and making others
difficult to discern. We do well to keep them all at our disposal. In general,
the better we understand all of the different ways of modeling a situation,
the better we understand the situation we are modeling. One might say
that there are heuristic reasons for aiming for a representation that ‘puts the
asymmetry into the cause rather than in the dependency relation’, because it
perspicuously displays, or makes explicit, the physically significant features
of the situation implicated in the production of the range B. But one might
find different reasons to leave it in the law of dependency. Either way we are
going to have to recognize that there is some physically significant difference
between T -related situations that manifests itself in the production of B.
That is the objective physical insight at the heart of CP.
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